Peace in Iraq
Neighbours the key to peace in Iraq
Amin Saikal
November 7, 2006
THE US President, George Bush, has hailed the sentencing of Saddam Hussein to death for crimes against humanity as a milestone and remarkable achievement for Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, has shared this sentiment. However, the verdict may well prove to be another event with little or no impact on the continued violent disorder that has gripped Iraq, threatening its very existence.
There can be no relief for either the Iraqi people or the occupying forces unless the United States changes its approach, with the aim of altering the dynamics on the ground in favour of a regional solution to the Iraq conflict.
Despite all the positive spin by Washington and its Iraqi allies, Iraq is heading towards disintegration into warring Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish entities. To arrest the situation, there is the need for regional actors, especially Iran and Syria, to use their leverage with Shiite and Sunni groups respectively to move them down the path of reconciliation, and weaken the growing insurgency.
This objective can be achieved, but only provided the US sets and adheres to a clear troop withdrawal timetable, and reaches a firm agreement with the Iranians and Syrians in the context of a regional conference, which could also involve the Arab League and Turkey. Although linked closely to different Iraqi groups, Iran and Syria are at the same time regional strategic allies. It is in their interest to respond to a credible promise of an American withdrawal from Iraq by doing everything possible to help reconcile the Shiites and Sunnis, and thus stabilise Iraq, especially if it is done in a way that could preserve the traditional national identity of Iraq as an Arab state. The Arab League and Turkey may well back such a development if they are also assured their regional interests are not undermined.
However, there are obstacles that need to be overcome. First, neither the Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis and their Iranian and Syrian backers, nor Turkey and the Arab League, especially the former, will be willing to acknowledge more than limited autonomy for the Kurds. A Shiite-Sunni reconciliation will enable these sects to dominate the power structure;the Kurds will be left the only minority, with little or no national and regional support to operate with even the degree of autonomy that they have enjoyed so far.
Not only will the Arab Iraqis be unfavourably disposed towards them, but also the Iranians, Turks and Syrians will be against any development that could encourage their own Kurdish minorities to emulate their Iraqi counterparts.
Second, given that the Bush Administration has condemned Iran and Syria, together with North Korea, as parts of an axis of evil, Tehran and Damascus are unlikely to lift a finger without some US concessions. In the case of Iran, its maximum negotiating position would be to demand at a minimum that the US and its allies cease all threats against it, accord full recognition to it, accept its quest to achieve a nuclear power status and release Iranian assets that Washington seized in the wake of the Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis a quarter of century ago.
As for Syria, it would want Washington and its allies to stop treating it as a pariah state and recognise it as a major player not only in Lebanon but also in relation to Israel, which it wants to withdraw from all post-1967 occupied territories, most importantly the Golan Heights. In addition, it would want wider economic and technological ties with and assistance from the US and its European allies.
Third, with a pullout from Iraq, Washington would need to be prepared to accept the possibility of a degradation of its presence in the Middle East and a rise in nationalist and Islamist opinion that could be unfavourable to its interests across the region.
If Washington, and Tehran and Damascus reach some accommodation on these issues, the prospects of a regional resolution seem brighter than many may have thought. Otherwise, neither Tehran nor Damascus would have much incentive to let the US off the hook easily - a hook which it has created but from which it now desperately wants to remove itself.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.
To read the original article from the Sydney Morning Herald, click on:
SMH
Amin Saikal
November 7, 2006
THE US President, George Bush, has hailed the sentencing of Saddam Hussein to death for crimes against humanity as a milestone and remarkable achievement for Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, has shared this sentiment. However, the verdict may well prove to be another event with little or no impact on the continued violent disorder that has gripped Iraq, threatening its very existence.
There can be no relief for either the Iraqi people or the occupying forces unless the United States changes its approach, with the aim of altering the dynamics on the ground in favour of a regional solution to the Iraq conflict.
Despite all the positive spin by Washington and its Iraqi allies, Iraq is heading towards disintegration into warring Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish entities. To arrest the situation, there is the need for regional actors, especially Iran and Syria, to use their leverage with Shiite and Sunni groups respectively to move them down the path of reconciliation, and weaken the growing insurgency.
This objective can be achieved, but only provided the US sets and adheres to a clear troop withdrawal timetable, and reaches a firm agreement with the Iranians and Syrians in the context of a regional conference, which could also involve the Arab League and Turkey. Although linked closely to different Iraqi groups, Iran and Syria are at the same time regional strategic allies. It is in their interest to respond to a credible promise of an American withdrawal from Iraq by doing everything possible to help reconcile the Shiites and Sunnis, and thus stabilise Iraq, especially if it is done in a way that could preserve the traditional national identity of Iraq as an Arab state. The Arab League and Turkey may well back such a development if they are also assured their regional interests are not undermined.
However, there are obstacles that need to be overcome. First, neither the Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis and their Iranian and Syrian backers, nor Turkey and the Arab League, especially the former, will be willing to acknowledge more than limited autonomy for the Kurds. A Shiite-Sunni reconciliation will enable these sects to dominate the power structure;the Kurds will be left the only minority, with little or no national and regional support to operate with even the degree of autonomy that they have enjoyed so far.
Not only will the Arab Iraqis be unfavourably disposed towards them, but also the Iranians, Turks and Syrians will be against any development that could encourage their own Kurdish minorities to emulate their Iraqi counterparts.
Second, given that the Bush Administration has condemned Iran and Syria, together with North Korea, as parts of an axis of evil, Tehran and Damascus are unlikely to lift a finger without some US concessions. In the case of Iran, its maximum negotiating position would be to demand at a minimum that the US and its allies cease all threats against it, accord full recognition to it, accept its quest to achieve a nuclear power status and release Iranian assets that Washington seized in the wake of the Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis a quarter of century ago.
As for Syria, it would want Washington and its allies to stop treating it as a pariah state and recognise it as a major player not only in Lebanon but also in relation to Israel, which it wants to withdraw from all post-1967 occupied territories, most importantly the Golan Heights. In addition, it would want wider economic and technological ties with and assistance from the US and its European allies.
Third, with a pullout from Iraq, Washington would need to be prepared to accept the possibility of a degradation of its presence in the Middle East and a rise in nationalist and Islamist opinion that could be unfavourable to its interests across the region.
If Washington, and Tehran and Damascus reach some accommodation on these issues, the prospects of a regional resolution seem brighter than many may have thought. Otherwise, neither Tehran nor Damascus would have much incentive to let the US off the hook easily - a hook which it has created but from which it now desperately wants to remove itself.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.
To read the original article from the Sydney Morning Herald, click on:
SMH
posted by Pax Christi @ Tuesday, November 07, 2006
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